

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 00115 01 OF 02 081109Z

13

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 AID-20

L-03 H-03 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-14 DRC-01

EUR-25 /130 W

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R 071411Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2303

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0115

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: CENTO

SUBJECT: CENTO SITUATION PAPER (REVISION NO 4)

REFS: A) ANKARA 86; B) STATE 663

SINCE POUCHED COPY REVISION NO 4 PROBABLY WILL NOT REACH DEPARTMENT FOR SOME DAYS, FOLLOWING ARE DESCRIPTIONS OF CONTENTIOUS PARAS PLUS EMB OBSERVATIONS ON ALL PARAS.

1. INTRODUCTION. SATISFACTORY.

2. FIRST SENTENCE WITH ENGLISH CORRECTED IS SAME AS REV 3. THEN FOLLOWS: QUOTE IT EXPLOITED THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 TO EXPAND ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD. DESPITE ITS PROFESSED DESIRE FOR DETENTE, ITS SUPPORT FOR EGYPT AND SYRIA DURING THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE ONCE AGAIN INDICATED THAT IT INTENDS TO SEIZE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENLARGE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, EVEN WHEN SUCH ACTIVITY THREATENS DETENTE. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE DETENTE DID NOT DETER SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS, IT DID MAKE POSSIBLE A MORE RAPID ACHIEVEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE SUBSEQUENT EASING OF THE SITUATION. UNQUOTE COMMENT: REF TO 242 WAS BEST US COULD DO TO BEAT DOWN PEJORATIVE REFERENCES TO ISRAEL. REST OF PARA ESSENTIALLY USG

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 00115 01 OF 02 081109Z

LANGUAGE. RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE.

3. 4. 5. SAME AS REV 3. WITH LANGUAGE CORRECTIONS,
SATISFACTORY.

6. SAME AS DESCRIBED ANKARA 9759. ACCEPTABLE.

7. READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THOUGH SOVIET MILITARY
INTERVENTION, IN THE EVENT OF POLITICAL UNREST IN ONE OF THE
REGIONAL COUNTRIES, IS UNLIKELY UNDER FORESEEABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT COMPLETELY. THE
SOVIETS MAY SUPPORT A LOCAL INSURRECTION BY CLANDESTINELY
PROVIDING MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, OR IT MAY SUPPORT A THIRD
PARTY AGAINST A REGIONAL COUNTRY. UNQUOTE COMMENT:
NOT GOOD, BUT PERHAPS BEST WE CAN OBTAIN.

8. SUBSTITUTE QUOTE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A POSSIBLE
SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE GUARD AGAINST
A POSSIBLE CHINESE ATTACK UNQUOTE. ACCEPTABLE.

9. AS CHANGED ANKARA 9759. ACCEPTABLE.

10. SAME AS REV 3. ACCEPTABLE.

11. SECOND SENTENCE STILL NOT ACCEPTABLE.
QUOTE HOWEVER, AS PART OF THEIR GENERAL MIDDLE EAST
POLICY, THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE
ON TURKEY'S SOUTHERN FLANK IN SYRIA AND IRAQ IN ORDER TO
ASSIST THEIR AIMS OF ENCIRCLING TURKEY. UNQUOTE
COMMENT: PROPOSE REVISING AFTER IRAQ: QUOTE THUS
ASSISTING ONE OF THEIR AIMS, WHICH IS TO ENCIRCLE TURKEY
UNQUOTE. COMPROMISE IS NEEDED WITH TURKEY ON THIS
POINT.

12. STILL WITH IRANIAN ADDITION (ANKARA 9759).
RZPOMMEND ACCEPTANCE.

13. 14. BASICALLY SAME AS REV 3. ACCEPTABLE.

15. AT LAST MEETING, SECRETARIAT PREPARED A DRAFT
UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR EARLIER COMPROMISES. WE KNOCKED
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PAGE 03 ANKARA 00115 01 OF 02 081109Z

IT BACK INTO FOLLOWING SHAPE, COMPROMISING ONLY ON FINAL
SENTENCE FOR SAKE OF PAK AGREEMENT: QUOTE IN
AUGUST 1971, THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY WAS SIGNED. THIS
PROVIDED FOR MUTUAL CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF WAR AND*
THE TAKING OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO MAINTAIN BEGIN INNERQUOTE
PEACE AND SECURITY END INNERQUOTE FOR THE TWO SIGNATORIES.
THIS TREATY WAS CONCLUDED AT A TIME WHEN INDIAN RELATIONS
WITH PAKISTAN WERE DETERIORATING OVER THE CRISIS IN EAST

PAKISTAN. IN OCTOBER 1971, ON THE ABSURD PLEA THAT PAKISTAN WAS A THREAT TO INDIAN SECURITY, INDIA INVOKED THE TREATY AND CONSULTATIONS WERE HELD BETWEEN INDIAN AND SOVIET LEADERS. THIS STRENGTHENED INDIA'S POSITION IN THE 1971 CRISIS AND CONTRIBUTED TO IN*IA'S DECISION TO FORCE A MILITARY CONFLICT. THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED INDIA DURING THE 1971 INDO-PAKISTAN WAR WHICH RESULTED IN THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN, AND CONSEQUENTLY PAKISTAN-USSR RELATIONS WERE SEVERELY STRAINED. CONCERN EXISTS IN PAKISTAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SUPPORTED INDIA IN ITS VENTURE IN ORDER TO WEAKEN PAKISTAN. SOVIET PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE SO LONG AS PAKISTAN REMAINS A HINDERENCE TO THE TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN THRUST TO THE WARM WATERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. UNQUOTE
COMMENT: NOTINGS REFS ELSEWHERE IN PAPER TO SOVIET INTERESTS IN QUOTE WARM WATERS UNQUOTE, WE WONDER WHETHER THIS LAST SENTENCE, WHICH IN ANY CASE IS ELLIPTICAL, CANNOT REMAIN.

16. IN ADDITION TO EARLIER CHANGES (ANKARA 9759), PHRASES AFTER PRC HAVING EMB IN SYRIA READS: QUOTE WHICH HAS SERVED AS ONE OF THE HEADQUARTERS FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. FOLLOWING THEIR NORMAL PRACTICE THEY MAY HAVE WARNED... UNQUOTE. ACCEPTABLE.

17. 18. 19. SAME AS REV 3. ACCEPTABLE.

20. IRANIANA, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, INSISTED ON DELETIONS OF USG AMENDMENTS (STATE 243244) REFERRING TO RESTORATION OF IRAN-IRAQI RELATIONS, ARGUING THIS FACT HAS NOT CHANGED SITUATION AS DESCRIED ELSEWHERE. PARA 20 IS NOW AS DESCRIBED ANKARA 9759, LESS US AMENDMENT, BUT ENDS WITH QUOTE ... TO THEIR NEW PARTNERS. UNQUOTE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ANKARA 00115 01 OF 02 081109Z

COMMENT: WE CAN PROBABLY GET OUR REFERENCES BACK IN PARA, BUT IN ALTERED FORM.

NEW PARA 21 STARTS WITH QUOTE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS ANTAGONIZED ... UNQUOTE FROM ORIGINAL PARA 20 AND CONCLUDES WITH REFERENCE TO AZAD BALUCHISTAN MOVEMENT DESCRIBED ANKARA 9759.

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 00115 02 OF 02 080530Z

13

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

AID-20 L-03 H-03 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-14

DRC-01 /130 W

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R 071411Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2304

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 0115

COMMENT: PAKS AND IRANIANS ARE UNITED ON THIS BALUCHI MOVE*ENT
SUBJECT AND THEIR EVALUATION APPEARS TO BE COMPLETELY SUBJECTIVE.
WORKING GROUP DID NOT ADEQUATELY ASSESS STRENGTH OF MOVE-
MENT OR POTENCY OF ITS THREAT. IF DEPARTMENT WILL GIVE US
ITS EVALUATION OF THIS SO-CALLED MOVEMENT (WEAK, FRAGMENTED,
POORLY-LED) AND INFORM US WHETHER IRAQ HAS INDEED SUPPORTED
IT, WE ARE CONFIDENT WE CAN AT LEAST CUT OUT THE HYPERBOLE.
ALSO, DO SOVIETS REALLY SUPPORT THIS MOVEMENT? (DEPARTMENT
IN ORIGINAL PARA 23 APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS JUDGMENT.)

ORIGINAL PARAS 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, NOW RE-
NUMBERED 22-28. MINOR CHANGES IN ADDITION TO THOSE
REPORTED ANKARA 9824. ACCEPTABEL.

ORIGINAL PARA 28, NOW RENUMBERED 29 AND 30. WITH
SINGLE EXCEPTION OF PHRASE QUOTE DESPITE THE TRADITIONAL
AFGHAN NON-ALLIGNED POSTURE IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS OVER THE
YEARS UNQUOTE, ALL USG LANGUAGE IS INCLUDED WORD FOR
WORD IN TWO NEW PARAS. UNFORTUNATELY SECRETARIAT, EITHER
TO MEET PRIVATE IRANIAN COMPLAINTS OR BECAUSE OF A MISTAKE,
INCLUDED IN REV 4 A FINAL IRANIAN SUMMING-UP AFTER USG
LANGUAGE: QUOTE THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
AND THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS TOGETHER WITH
THE ROLE OF SOVIET-TRAINED OFFICERS IN THE COUNTRY, AND DAUD'S
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF SUPPORT TO SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS, PROVIDE
THE SOVIETS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLIT THE SITUATION AND THIS
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PAGE 02 ANKARA 00115 02 OF 02 080530Z

TURN OF EVENTS MAY POSE A THREAT TO THE CENTO REGIONAL
COUNTRIES. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: WE WILL ARGUE FOR ELIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF REDUNDANCY WITH USG LANGUAGE.

33. (FORMERLY 31). STILL UNSATISFACTORY AND SAME AS DESCRIBED ANKARA 9824. FINAL SENTENCE, HOWEVER, READS: QUOTE INDIA AND CHINA FOUGHT A BORDER WAR IN 1962 BUT THE CLASHES REMAINED LOCALIZED. UNQUOTE. LATTER ACCEPTABLE.

34. (FORMERLY 32). TURKS, PAKS AND IRANIANS ALL BELIEVE THAT BREZHNEV VISIT WAS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. TURKS ARGUE THAT ONE ECONOMIC AGREEMENT IN EFFECT PERMITTED SOME USSR INVOLVEMENT IN INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN LOCAL ARMS PRODUCTION FOR FIRST TIME. THEREFORE, AFTER FIRST TWO SENTENCES, WHICH LARGELY REFLECT USG DRAFTING PROPOSALS, REMAINDER OF PARA READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE DURING THIS VISIT, TWO ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND ONE CONSULAR AGREEMENT WERE SIGNED WHICH MAY STRENGTHEN INDO-SOVIET COOPERATION. A LARGE WHEAT LOAN OF 2 MILLION TONS TO INDIA WAS AGREED UPON. AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT NEW EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THUS ON THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971. THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT THIS VISIT WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. HOWEVER, INDIA HAS SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM. UNQUOTE COMMENT: IN PROPOSING NEW LANGUAGE OR, FOR EXAMPLE, DELETION OF THE SENTENCE BEGINNING QUOTE AS A RESULT UNQUOTE, DEPARTMENT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL THESE PARAS ON INDIA REFLECT A CONSIDERABLE TONING DOWN OF WHAT THE PAKISTANIS ORIGINALLY DESIRED.

35-45. (FORMERLY 33-44). WITH A FEW DRAFTING CHANGES, ARE THE SAME AS REV 3 AS AMENDED BY ANKARA 9824* ACCEPTABLE IN THE MAIN.

46. (FORMERLY 45) EXCEPT FOR SUBSTITUTION OF QUOTE SOLIDARITY UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE INTERDEPENDENCE UNQUOTE IN LAST SENTENCE OF SUB-PARA C), THIS PARA IS IDENTICAL TO REV 3. ACCEPTABLE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ANKARA 00115 02 OF 02 080530Z

47. CONCLUSIONS (FORMERLY 46).

SUB-PARA A) SAME AS REV 3. COMMENT: DEPARTMENT PLEASE NOTE REFERENCE TO QUOTE EVENTUALLY UNOBSTRUCTED ACCESS TO WARM SEAS UNQUOTE, WHICH SOMEWHAT JUSTIFIES LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 15. ACCEPTABLE.

SUB-PARA B) TEXT IN ANKARA 86. ACCEPTABLE.

SUB-PARA C) SAME AS DESCRIBED ANKARA 9824,
EXCEPT THAT FINAL SENTENCE NOW READS: QUOTE ANY
IMPROVEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE U.S. IN THE ARAB
WORLD WILL DEPEND ON THE EXTENT OF ITS CONTRIBUTION
TO PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNQUOTE. NOT GOOD, BUT MAY
BE BARELY ACCEPTABLE.

SUB-PARA D) TO REV 3. VERSION, ADD FINAL
SENTENCE: QUOTE THIS IS PARTICULARLY THE CASE IN IRAQ'S
DEALINGS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN'S DEALINGS
WITH PAKISTAN. UNQUOTE W* DO NOT LIKE FINAL SENTENCE BUT
MUST ADMIT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF PAPER.

NEW IRANIAN-PROPOSED SUB-PARA E) AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE SOVIET-
IRAQI TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION OF APRIL 1972
HAS ALSO ENCOURAGED IRAQ IN ITS PURSUIT OF PROVIDING SUPPORT
TO SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN THE REGION. UNQUOTE THIS GOES
TOO FAR, BUT WE WANT DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE.

NEW IRANIAN-PROPOSED SUB-PARA F); QUOTE THE SOVIET UNION'S
ACTIVITIES AGAINST REGIONAL CENTO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING
SUBVERSION AND INTERFERENCE BY PROXY, MAY BE FACILITATED
BY ANY INCREASED INFLUENCE THE SOVIETS HAVE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AS RESULT OF THEIR ATTITUDE IN THE OCTOBER 1973
ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE AS WELL AS THE COUP D'ETAT IN
AFGHANISTAN. UNQUOTE
COMMENT: DEPARTMENT WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS A KEY
CONCLUSION AS FAR AS IRAN AND PAKISTAN ARE CONCERNED.
ARGUMENT ESSENTIALLY IS THAT AS SOVIETS INFLUENCE INCREASES
POSSIBILITIES OF SUBVERSION OR INTERFERENCE ALSO GO UP.
DEPARTMENT PLEASE NOTE USE OF QUOTE MAY UNQUOTE AND
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PAGE 04 ANKARA 00115 02 OF 02 080530Z

QUOTE ANY UNQUOTE. DEPARTMENT ALSO SHOULD NOTE THAT
WE HAVE BEEN ARGUING CONSISTENTLY AGAINST CONCEPTS OF
ENCIRCLEMENT, THE BRIDGEHEAD AND INTERFERENCE BY PROXY.
IT MAY BE NECESSARY IN THE END FOR THE USG TO RESERVE ITS
POSITION ON ALL THESE POINTS.

SUB-PARA G), H), I), J). (FORMERLY F), G),
H), I)). RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE.
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Message Attributes

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